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Online Sovereignty: The Law and
Economics of
Tribal Electronic Conmerce
Gavin Clarkson,* KatherineA. Spilde,** and Carma M. Claw***
ABSTRACT

In 1886, the US Supreme Court wrote that, for Indian tribes,
"the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies." Recently, state agencies and regulators have continued that
tradition of hostility by improperly attempting to regulate electronic
commerce businesses operated by tribal governments that are more
properly subject to regulations established by tribal law and subject to
federal oversight. Despite the fact that these online businesses operate
exclusively under tribal law and make their tribal affiliation clear to
customers, certain state regulators have demanded absolute
compliance with state law, even when such laws are from states
thousands of miles away.
Not only does this overreaching by
uninformed state regulators limit the products available to consumers,
it also severely undercuts on-reservation economic development,
imperils tribal electronic commerce, and challenges basic notions of
tribal sovereignty.
Businesses and consumers entering into commercial contracts
rely heavily on consistency and predictabilityin contracting, including
when the parties mutually agree to apply tribal law or utilize tribal
courts to resolve disputes. Uniform interpretationand enforcement of
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such agreements are critical to ensuring continued investment in tribal
businesses. With over one quarter of American Indians living in
poverty-nearly twice the national average-it has never been more
important to promote confidence in the Indian economy. When courts
do not give full force and effect to contractingparties'desires to resolve
their private disputes using tribal courts and tribal law, this
confidence is threatened. While it is unclear how this controversy will
ultimately play out, one thing is certain: states are not only
undermining tribal innovation and harming tribal economies but also
attacking tribal sovereignty itself.
Perhaps lost in the legal rancor, however, are the very real
human and economic consequences of the loss of tribal revenues from
e-commerce business, as well as the potential damage to tribal
e-commerce as a whole. This Article presents results of empirical
research into the economic impact of tribal online lending in Indian
Country. The Article first frames the issue with a brief summary of the
legal foundations for tribal e-commerce and tribal lending in
particular. Next, the Article presents several case studies of tribes that
have engaged in online lending, focusing on the direct economic impact
to those tribal communities. Finally, the Article concludes with policy
arguments as to why state and federal regulators should support
rather than suppress tribal e-commerce, including tribal small-dollar
online lending.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In an 1886 case, the US Supreme Court wrote that, for Indian
tribes, "the people of the states where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies."' Although that observation is nearly 150 years
old, this tradition of hostility continues, particularly between state
regulators and tribal governments in the arena of electronic commerce
or "e-commerce."
Numerous states have recently asserted jurisdiction over
tribally owned businesses that are subject only to a combination of
tribal and federal regulation. For example, the State of New York has
asserted jurisdiction over online lending activities of a tribal
government in Oklahoma in spite of the fact that consumers are
signing contracts solely with the tribe. 2 Despite the fact that these
businesses operate exclusively under tribal law and make their tribal
affiliations clear to customers, certain state regulators have demanded
absolute compliance with state law, even when such laws are from
states thousands of miles away. 3 Not only does this overreaching by
uninformed state regulators limit the products available to consumers,
it also severely undercuts on-reservation economic development and
challenges basic notions of tribal sovereignty.
Perhaps lost in the legal rancor, however, are the very real
human and economic consequences of the loss of tribal lending as an ecommerce business, as well as the potential damage to tribal ecommerce as a whole. In presenting the results of empirical research
into the economic impact of tribal online lending in Indian Country,
this Article first frames the issue in Part II with an overview of tribal
economies and the need for e-commerce. It then continues in Part III
with a brief summary of the legal foundations for tribal e-commerce
and tribal lending in particular. In Part IV, this Article presents
several case studies of tribes that have engaged in online lending,
focusing on the direct economic impact to those tribal communities.
Part V presents several policy arguments as to why state and federal
regulators should support rather than suppress tribal e-commerce,
1.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
2.
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 107
(2d Cir. 2014).
3.
Such as New York's attempted enforcement in Oklahoma. Id.
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including tribal small-dollar online lending. In anticipation of
potential objections, Part VI of this Article summarizes a set of best
practices adopted by the vast majority of tribal online lenders. This
Article examines the broader policy implications of a continued
assault on tribal online lending in Part VII by examining potential
collateral damage to other forms of e-commerce in Indian Country
before concluding with Part VIII.
II. TRIBAL ECONOMICS AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
On-reservation tribal businesses are vital to the sovereignty
and welfare of tribal governments, American Indians, and Alaska
Natives nationwide. In 2014, the US Supreme Court reiterated that
"[a] key goal of the Federal Government is to render Tribes more
self-sufficient and better positioned to fund their own sovereign
functions, rather than relying on Federal funding."4 With dwindling
federal funds, tribal communities face significant challenges in
establishing steady revenue streams and attracting external
investors.6 While not exclusively linked to location, these challenges
to tribal economic development are often entrenched because a
majority of reservation lands are geographically isolated, historically
disadvantaged, and poor.6
Most tribal communities struggle with long-standing cycles of
poverty and, as with other developing nations, the need for economic
development on tribal lands remains acute and affects nearly every
aspect of reservation life. 7 Large portions of Indian Country lack basic
infrastructure, posing a daunting barrier to tribal leaders' attempts to
develop their economies. Such realities highlight the importance of
stimulating economic development for the social and economic
Research from the 2006-2010
recovery of tribal communities.

4.

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring).
STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, SOVEREIGNTY AND NATION-BUILDING: THE
5.
TODAY
5-7
(1998),
IN
INDIAN
COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT
CHALLENGE

http://hpaied.org/sites/default/files/publications/PRS98-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC4L-AU6G].
6.
See, e.g., Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and Barriers
to Tribal CapitalMarket Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 945 (2008); see also Randall K.Q.
Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its
Effects on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 189 (2015); Gavin
Clarkson, Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private Equity into Indian Country as a
Domestic Emerging Market, 80 COLO. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (2009); Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds:
Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1009, 1014 (2007).
7.
Randall K.Q. Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, Social and Economic
Changes on American Indian Reservations in California: An Examination of Twenty Years of
Tribal Government Gaming, 18 U.N.L.V. GAMING RES. & REV. J. 39, 50 (2014).
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American Indian Community Surveys indicate that the pace of
reservation economic growth slowed between 2000 and 2010.8

While

economic growth on reservations outpaced the rate of economic growth
in the United States during the recession, the income gap between
people living on reservations and the rest of the United States
remains large, with the real per capita income for American Indians
on reservations at $12,142 compared to a $26,893 average for all races
in the United States. 9 Economists now speculate that current growth
rates on reservations have slowed to the point that this gap will not
close before the year 2054.10
Although tribal leaders have acknowledged and attempted to
reduce these problems for decades, they have not had the resources to
create a more hospitable business environment. A vicious cycle has
consequently developed: businesses avoid establishing a presence on
reservations because of the lack of infrastructure, while tribal
governments are left unable to improve their infrastructure because
on-reservation commerce is woefully insufficient.
To break this cycle and increase revenue, tribal leaders have
relied on their most tangible, sustainable competitive advantage:
tribal sovereignty. As nations that predate the Constitution and the
United States, tribal nations can generally operate in licensed
environments independent of state regulation.
This notion of
excluding state law and regulatory authority is one of the founding
principles of the Supreme Court's Indian Law jurisprudence and
stems from an 1832 case, Worcester v. Georgia." In that case, the
state of Georgia passed a law requiring any non-Native person living
within the borders of the Cherokee Nation to get a license to do so
from the State. 12 Several missionaries, including Reverend Worcester,
defied the law, were arrested, and were sentenced to four years of
hard labor. 13 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices found that
the Cherokee Nation was "a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force." 14

8.
RANDALL K.Q. AKEE & JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE ON
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A DATABOOK OF THE US CENSUSES AND THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
SURVEY
1990-2010,
at
v
(2014),
http://staticl.squarespace.com/static

/52557b58e4b0d4767401ce95/t/5379756ce4b095f55e75c77b/1400468844624/AkeeTaylorUSDatab
ook2014-05-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YK-ZEUE].
9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 594-96 (1832).

12.
13.
14.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 520.
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As the Chairwoman of the Habematolel Pomo Indians of Upper
Lake recently testified before the House Committee on Financial
Services:
The inherent sovereign power of Indian Tribes predates the United States Constitution.
Indian Nations appears twice in the Constitution, each time in Article I, treated as
separate and existing sovereign nations. Nearly every piece of modern legislation
dealing with Indian tribes explicitly affirms the protective trust relationship between
tribes and the federal government. . . . The sole power to diminish tribal sovereignty
rests with Congress. Whatever Congress has not expressly diminished by legislation
15
remains for the exercise of tribal governments.

By leveraging this sovereignty to their advantage, 16 some tribal
governments have relied on gaming and a lack of sales tax to entice
consumers to visit and invest in their communities.1 7 Contrary to
popular belief, however, gaming does not provide sufficient recovery
for most tribal economies. A majority of the more than 567 federally
recognized Indian tribes do not have significant gaming operations,18
and of those that do, only a small handful generate substantial
revenues. 19 While a few tribes near major metropolitan centers
operate successful gaming enterprises, hundreds of tribes have
reservation lands that do not support a gaming industry of any kind,
while others operate small casinos located far from population
centers. 20 Thus, the economic benefits of gaming are not universally
For example, the
distributed throughout Indian Country.

Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB's Assault on Access to Credit and
15.
Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th
Cong. 1 (2016), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-bal5-wstate-streppa(testimony of Sherry Treppa, Chairperson,
20160211.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPS5-TQ2B]
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake) [hereinafter Short-Term, Small DollarLending].
16.
See generally Gavin Clarkson & James K. Sebenius, Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty
for Economic Opportunity:A Strategic Negotiations Perspective, 76 MO. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2011).
17.
Akee, Spilde & Taylor, supra note 6, at 201.
NAT'L INDIAN GAMING AsS'N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN
18.
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran-storage
27
(2005),
at
IN
2005,
GAMING
/www.indiangaming.org/ContentPages/52719314.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY2C-FC7L]. According to
the National Indian Gaming Association, only 224 tribes have gaming operations of any kind as
of 2005. Id. at 2.
See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY
19.
(1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf
COMMISSION REPORT, at 2-10
[https://perma.cc/27BS-JNWP] ("The 20 largest Indian gambling facilities account for 50.5% of
total revenues, with the next 85 accounting for (only] 41.2%. Additionally, not all gambling
facilities are successful. Some tribes operate their casinos at a loss and a few have even been
forced to close money-losing facilities."). Note also that many tribes that do generate significant
revenues often must share those revenues with the state as part of the compacting process of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii) (2012). In some cases, such as
with the Mohegan and Mashantucket Pequot tribes in Connecticut, the revenue share is as high
as 25%. See, e.g., Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 16, at 1047.
20.
See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002,
at 44.
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unemployment rate still hovers around 50 percent for Indians who live
on reservations, nearly ten times that for the United States as a
whole, 21 and more than one-third of American Indian children live in
poverty. 22
The dawn of the Internet Age, however, ushered in a variety of
new opportunities for tribes located in rural areas to become hotbeds
for business innovation.
Most significantly, tribal governments
realized that they could export services via the Internet to transact
business with consumers anywhere in the country while still being
subject to tribal law alone. 23 The key to this arrangement was
conducting business so that all transactions occurred on the
reservation and ensuring that consumers consented to the application
of tribal law instead of state law. 2 4 Seizing upon this model, tribal
governments began offering small-dollar loans to consumers who
needed money quickly or who were unable to obtain funding from
traditional sources. 25
Customer need for and response to these
financial services were overwhelming, and much-needed tribal
government revenues began to flow into some of the poorest tribal
communities. 26
The tribe-owned businesses that offer and service these loans
were organized to take advantage of the sovereign authority that their
tribes exercised over the reservation. 27 Under this arrangement,
consumers gravitated to tribal lenders and exemplified a classic quid

21.

See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 2005 AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR

FORCE REPORT, at iv (2006), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4B5F-M327].
22.
See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN: FINDINGS FROM THE BASE YEAR OF THE EARLY CHILDHOOD
LONGITUDINAL
STUDY,
BIRTH
COHORT
(ECLS-B)
3
(2005),

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005116.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AZE-L66S].
23.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1001-1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2012); see also Is Sovereign Immunity for
Tribal Lending Coming to an End?, PYMNTS.COM (June 30, 2015), http://www.pymnts.com/indepthl2015/is-sovereign-immunity-for-tribal-payday-lending-coming-to-an-end/
[https://perma.cc/9XWT-4UB5] [hereinafter PYMNTS]; The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act
Benefits
Native
Americans,
U.S.
DEP'T
TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Pages/Native-Americans.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LX3BAVAY] (last updated Jan. 26, 2011, 10:03 AM).
24.
Peter Lattman, Tribes Challenge New York's Authority over Their Lending, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/1 1/indian-tribes-press-their-onlineloan-case-against-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/ZR4X-E3VY].
25.
PYMNTS, supra note 23.
26.
See Julia Harte & Joanna Zuckerman, Payday Nation, AL JAZEERA AM. (June 17,
2014),
http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/payday-nation/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F2ZZLVNG].
27.
Bree Black Horse, Note, The Risks and Benefits of Tribal Payday Lending to Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 388, 394-96 (2013).
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pro quo. 28 Tribal businesses provided consumers with small-dollar
loans that other lenders were unwilling or unable to offer, and in
return, consumers agreed to enter into loan agreements consummated
on tribal land that were subject only to tribal law. 29 Believing this
arrangement to be a reasonable transaction, thousands of customers
obtained
much-needed funds on short notice from tribal lenders through the
Internet. 30 Many of them became repeat customers who, despite the
availability of multiple off-reservation alternatives (both online and
from land-based operations), intentionally chose to return virtually to
the reservation to obtain additional financing. 31
State efforts to regulate or even prohibit tribe-regulated
lending began just as the model was being streamlined and perfected.
Even though consumers explicitly agreed that their loans were subject
only to tribal laws, states began suing tribal lenders for failing to obey
local lending laws and failing to obtain state certifications. 3 2 Initial
tribal objections to these regulations relied upon the fact that the
prevailing federal legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act, 33 acknowledged
that tribes are to be treated as states for the purposes of financial
services. 34 In spite of a clear federal mandate, attempted state
regulation became more fervent and widespread. 35 Faced with costly
litigation in multiple states, many tribal government lenders were
forced to cease or significantly reduce their operations, thereby cutting
off vital economic lifelines in their communities. 36 While it is unclear
how this controversy will ultimately play out, one thing is certain:

28.

See Lattman, supra note 24.

29.

Id.

30.

Harte & Zuckerman, supra note 26.

Id.
31.
Lattman, supra note 24.
32.
Id.
33.
34.
There is one mention of tribes in the Dodd-Frank Act, and that occurs in the
definition of "State": The term "State" means any State, territory, or possession of the United
States . . . or any federally recognized Indian tribe, as defined by the Secretary of the Interior
under section 479a-1(a) of title 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 1002(27), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(27) (2012).
Jane Daugherty, Feds Claim Tribal Lenders Not a Target; Tribes Sue NY Over
35.
Crackdown,

INDIAN

COUNTRY

TODAY

(Aug.

23,

2013),

http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
/2013/08/23/feds-claim-tribal-lenders-not-target-tribes-sue-ny-over-crackdown- 151001
[https://perma.cclM5QG-4RYH].
See, e.g., Jim Gallagher, Reservation Payday Lender to Pay Restitution to
36.
http://www.stltoday.com
2015),
Missourians, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Mar. 5,
/business/local/reservation-payday-lender-to-pay-restitution-to-missourians/article_1625086f85b6-555f-9d01-a3506bl3e09b.html [https://perma.cc/5Y8K-RF52]; see also Harte & Zuckerman,
supra note 26.
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states are not only undermining tribal innovation and harming tribal
economies but are also attacking tribal sovereignty itself. 37
Businesses and consumers entering into commercial contracts
rely heavily on consistency and predictability in contracting, including
when the parties agree to apply tribal law or utilize tribal courts to
resolve disputes. Uniform interpretation and enforcement of such
agreements are critical to ensuring continued investment in tribal
businesses. With over one-quarter of American Indians living in
poverty-nearly twice the national average 38-it has never been more
important to promote confidence in the Indian economy. When courts
do not give full force and effect to contracting parties' desires to
resolve their private disputes using tribal courts and tribal law, this
confidence is threatened.
III. THE LAW AND REGULATION OF ONLINE TRIBAL LENDING
The market for small-dollar lending is broad and deep, and the
conditions that support its growth pre-date tribal government
involvement in the industry. Tribal small-dollar online lending would
not exist without a market of "underbanked" consumers not
adequately serviced by traditional lenders. The 2013 FDIC National
Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households defines the
underbanked as individuals with a checking or savings account who
still must rely on alternative financial services such as check-cashing
services, payday loans, rent-to-own agreements, or pawn shops. 39 One
in five (or twenty-four million) households were underbanked in 2013,
consisting of an estimated sixty-eight million people. 40 According to
the same report, 9.6 million households representing twenty-five
million people were unbanked in 2013, defined as those who "do not
have an account at an insured institution." 41 More than a third (35.6
percent) of unbanked households reported the main reasons for not
having an account were insufficient money to keep in an account or
not meeting minimum balance requirements. 42 In addition, 34.1
percent of households that recently became unbanked experienced
37.
Jane Daugherty, New York's Attack on Tribal Lenders Is a Threat to All Natives,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 25, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
/2013/08/25/new-yorks-attack-tribal-lenders-threat-all-natives [https://perma.cclU43P-96RR].
38.
See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU,
POVERTY RATES: 2007-2011,
at 2 (2013),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbrl1-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UB5-CPDR].
39.

FED.

DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC, 2013 NATIONAL

UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS
[https://perma.cc/FGD2-QD63].
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 24.

4

(2014),

SURVEY OF UNBANKED

AND

https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf
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either a significant income loss or job loss that they said contributed to
becoming underbanked. 43 Traditional banks and lending institutions
are not serving these consumers.
In spite of the federal government's attempt under the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 44 to incentivize banks to serve
the communities in which they operate, research reveals that the CRA
operates inefficiently in many regions. The CRA was intended to push
banks to reinvest and help rein in the "redlining" of poor communities,
the long-time practice of not offering mortgages in "bad"
neighborhoods.4 5 While the Federal Reserve is "'currently considering
what can be done to make CRA a more effective regulatory incentive
going forward to address an unprecedented set of community needs,'
the CRA apparatus has never even rated the availability of basic
banking services" for the underbanked. 46
Given the megabanks' lack of attention to underbanked
Americans, tribal governments have stepped in to serve them
remotely through online lending businesses located on tribal lands.
While not specifically subject to the CRA, tribal governments are in an
ideal position to fulfill the mandates of the CRA. Through online
lending, tribes can provide a critical service for financially fragile
Americans while actively investing the governmental revenues from
their lending businesses into struggling tribal communities and
surrounding regions. In many respects, tribal online lenders are
responding not only to the vast unmet need but also to Congressional
intent as embodied in the CRA.
A. Tribal Governments and the CRA
Academic research in law and geography has revealed
numerous ways that laws are intended to influence or control
behaviors across physical space. 47 A so-called "law and geography"
analysis uses geographic tools to understand the consequences of legal

Id. at 6.
43.
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, §§ 801-806, 91
44.
Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2012)).
45.
E.g., Aleatra P. Williams, Lending Discrimination, the Foreclosure Crisis and the
Perpetuationof Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership in the U.S., 6 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 601, 625 (2015) (citing Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of
Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1285, 1318 (1995)).
46.
Jeff Foreman, Op-Ed: Poor People Can't Bank on Banking Services, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (June 6, 2013), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ opinion/4250-poor-peoplecant-bank-on-banking-services [https://perma.cc/KB77-657L].
47.
See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
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policies and institutions.48 For example, several authors have used
geographic analyses of mortgage lending patterns to demonstrate
racial bias in the approval of credit applications.4 9
Previous geographic evidence was also used to demonstrate
that storefront payday lenders disproportionately located their
branches around military bases, persuading Congress to adopt a
federal usury law and arbitration ban on some loans to military
personnel.50

Geographic analysis also helped convince Congress that, in
some communities, banks accepted deposits but did not give out an
equivalent amount in loans-a process called "disinvestment."5 1
Accordingly, Congress adopted the CRA requiring that depository
institutions make efforts to lend in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods within the contiguous geographic area surrounding
their office or group of offices. 52 In spite of the CRA requirements,
however, research by the New York City's Association for
Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) reveals how the
federal government's attempt under the CRA to make banks serve the
communities in which they operate actually affects low-income
neighborhoods in the city.53
Banks are bringing in record earnings, but ANHD finds their
investments insufficient to truly help "meet the credit needs of
low- and moderate-income New Yorkers." 54 It reports that the city's
twenty-three largest banks have deposits in the city exceeding $590
billion, but lend or invest only 1.35 percent of those deposits in a way
that benefits low- and moderate-income residents.5 5 Even with an
48.
E.g., Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday"Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653,
694 (2005).
49.
See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J.
EcoN. PERSP., 41, 41 (1998); Douglas S. Massey, Jacob S. Rugh, Justin P. Steil & Len Albright,
Riding the Stagecoach to Hell: A Qualitative Analysis of Racial Discrimination in Mortgage
Lending, 15 CITY & COMMUNITY 118 (2016).
50.
Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law and The ChristianRight:
Faith-BasedPoliticalPower and the Geography of American Payday Loan Regulation, 57 CATH.
U. L. REV. 637, 656 (2008).
51.
See Jean Pogge, Reinvestment in Chicago Neighborhoods: A Twenty-Year Struggle,
in FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO URBAN DISINVESTMENT 133
(Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992).
52.
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, §§ 801-806, 91
Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2012)).
53.

Jaime Weisberg, ASS'N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUS. DEV., THE STATE OF BANK

REINVESTMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: 2014, at 5-6 (2015), http://www.anhd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/2014-REPORT-SinglePage-NoBleedFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VW8Q-2D9J].
Id. at 10.
54.
55.
Id. at 25-32.
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average reinvestment of 1.35 percent, the study found several banksBank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Sovereign, Apple Bank, Astoria,
Emigrant, Ridgewood, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of
NY Mellon-each reinvested less than 1 percent of their New York
City deposits in New York City.5 6 JPMorgan reinvested just 0.33
percent of its more than $385 billion in city deposits and Deutsche
Bank just 0.57 percent.5 7
The four biggest American megabanks-JPMorgan Chase,
Citibank, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo-have over 61 percent of
all New York City deposits according to ANHD.5 8 They also have
about half of all city government deposits in their banks, amounting to
over $230 million. 59 But those institutions are not looking for lowincome city resident depositors. That kind of financial investment in
underserved communities is vital to low-income neighborhoods and
residents, yet banks are failing to adequately provide these services in
areas where they are most needed. In the era of "too big to fail"
megabanks merging and buying out smaller institutions, immense
competition exists for wealth management services and private
banking for multi-millionaires, but interest for vital banking services
for low-income customers diminishes.
Tribal government innovation in short-term, online lending
serves the financially fragile and subprime borrowers that traditional
banks and institutions typically shun. Efforts by federal or state
regulators to "choke off' access to credit for underbanked people in
this country reveals the protectionism afforded to mainstream
financial institutions, as well as the ways that nonprime consumers
are overlooked or actively ignored.
B. Tribal Government Inclusion in the Dodd-FrankAct
When tribal governments began to pursue gaming as a form of
economic development in the 1970s and 1980s, they had to pursue a
series of court cases culminating in the 1987 US Supreme Court
decision California v. Cabazon, which clarified that tribal
governments retain civil regulatory authority on tribal lands.6 0 With
tribal online lending, there is no need for such a fight since tribes'

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 8-14.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 39-41.
Id. at 10.
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
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authority to offer and regulate financial services is already enshrined
in federal law.6 1

Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, 62 the Consumer Financial
Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act), created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB)63 to ensure "that all consumers have access
to markets for consumer financial products and services and that
markets for consumer financial products and services are fair,
transparent, and competitive." 64
The CFPB has the power to
promulgate rules to administer and carry out the purposes and
objectives of the CFP Act and eighteen existing federal consumer
financial protection statutes, each an "Enumerated Consumer Law." 6 5
It also has the power to regulate activities relating to consumer real
estate lending activities, payday loans, private student loans, and any
larger participant of consumer financial products or services.6 6
Congress's drafting of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals its intention
to include tribes among the financial regulators and not the regulated.
The only mention of tribes occurs in the Dodd-Frank Act's definition of
State: "The term 'State' means any state, territory, or possession of the
United States .

.

. or any federally recognized Indian tribe, as defined

by the Secretary of the Interior under section 479a-1(a) of title 25."67
Accordingly, each time "State" appears in the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress intended these provisions to cover tribes and to treat tribes
the same way states are treated.
Treating tribes as states is
consistent with the general federal policy of encouraging tribes to
strengthen self-government and to assume control over their business
and economic affairs.
All of the references to states throughout the CFP Act highlight
the cooperation Congress envisioned between the federal government
and states (and thus, by definition, tribes). For example, the DoddFrank Act: (i) requires the CFPB to coordinate "fair lending efforts of
the [CFPB] with other Federal agencies and State regulators, as
appropriate, to promote consistent, efficient, and effective enforcement
of Federal fair lending laws,"6 8

(ii) gives states a significant role in

61.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2012).
62.
Consumer Financial Protection (CFP) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 10011100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(2012).
63.
§ 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964.
64.
§ 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979.
65.
§ 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980.
66.
§ 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964.
67.
§ 1002(27), 124 Stat. at 1955.
68.
§ 1013(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1966.
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collecting and tracking consumer complaints, and (iii) requires that,
"[i]n developing and implementing registration requirements [for
covered persons]," 6 9 the CFPB must "consult with State agencies
regarding requirements or systems (including coordinated or
combined systems for registration), where appropriate."7 0
Further reinforcing the idea that Congress intended states
(and, by definition, tribes) to be co-regulators, the Dodd-Frank Act
promotes enforcement of state consumer protection laws and state
power to directly enforce state and federal law. For example, the CFP
Act provides that, but for a few exceptions, it "may not be construed as
annulling, altering, or affecting, or exempting any person subject to
the provisions of this subchapter from complying with, the statutes,
regulations, orders, or interpretations in any State, except to the
extent that any such provision of law is inconsistent with the
provisions of this title . . . ."71 The CFP Act also provides that "[n]o
provision of this title, except as is provided in section 1083, shall be
construed as modifying, limiting, or superseding the operation of any
provision of an enumerated consumer law that relates to the
application of a law in effect in any State with respect to such Federal
law." 72

The CFP Act uses the term "State" 164 times and generally
does so within the following four contexts: (i) in requiring the CFPB
and states to coordinate with respect to regulating consumer financial
products or services; (ii) in requiring the CFPB and states to share
reports relating to persons providing consumer financial products or
services; (iii) in discussions of state law in the context of preemption;
and (iv) in definitions and exclusions not relevant to lending. 73 The
CFP Act never uses the term "State" in the context of waiving
74
immunity from suit or granting a court jurisdiction to hear a claim.
Tribes, therefore, have pursued lending businesses from the position
that they may engage in lending without waiving their sovereign
immunity with respect to state enforcement actions or private plaintiff
suits as a result of definitional aspects of the CFP Act.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

§ 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980.
§ 1024, 124 Stat. at 1987.
§ 1041(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2011.
§ 1041(b), 124 Stat. at 2011.
See generally §§ 1001-1100H, 124
See § 1053, 124 Stat. at 2025.

Stat. at 1955-2113.
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C. Tribal Lending Entities Improve Access to Mainstream Financial
Institutions
The stated purpose of Title XII of the Dodd-Frank Act is "to
encourage initiatives for financial products and services that are
appropriate

and accessible

for . ..

Americans

who are

not fully

incorporated into the financial mainstream." 75 To encourage these
initiatives, the Treasury Secretary has the authority, but not the
obligation, to establish programs intended to enable low- and
moderate-income individuals to establish accounts at insured deposit
institutions and enter into low-cost, small loans as alternatives to
payday loans. 76 Only certain eligible entities are permitted to
participate in these programs and thereby offer such loans and
provide related services.7 7 The Dodd-Frank Act expressly defines such
eligible entities to include "tribal government entities," 78 thereby
recognizing that tribal entities may play an important role in
consumer finance. The Treasury Secretary, to date, has neither
promulgated any rules implementing the programs nor indicated
whether the Treasury Department intends to do so. Regardless, by
including tribal entities in the definition of eligible entities, Congress
has expressly recognized that tribes have the ability, if not the right,
to play an important role in consumer finance. 79 If the Treasury
Department decides to move forward with certain initiatives, it may
provide a strong opportunity for tribes to expand their footprint in the
financial system.
First, Title XII authorizes the Treasury Secretary to establish a
multiyear program of grants, cooperative agreements, and other
undertakings for the purposes of: (i) enabling low- and moderateincome individuals to establish accounts in a federally insured
depository institution, and (ii) improving access to such accounts on
Eligible entities, potentially including tribal
reasonable terms.80
entities, participating in these programs may provide products and
services to low- and moderate-income persons, including small-dollar
value loans and financial education and counseling relating to
conducting transactions and managing accounts.
Second, Title XII authorizes the Treasury Secretary to
establish a multiyear demonstration program to provide low-cost,

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

§ 1202, 124 Stat. at 2129.
§ 1205, 124 Stat. at 2130.
§ 1203(3), 124 Stat. at 2129.
§ 1203(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 2129.
See § 1203(3), 124 Stat. at 2129.
§ 1204(a), 124 Stat. at 2130.
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small loans to consumers as an alternative to costlier payday loans.8 1

Lenders must make these loans on terms and conditions and pursuant
to lending practices that are reasonable for borrowers. 82 Eligible
entities must provide financial literacy education to each borrower
provided with a loan pursuant to this program. 83
D. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as an Analogue
Tribal governments that participate in e-commerce, including
legal online lending, are putting these governmental revenues to use
in ways that fulfill the mandate of the CRA and which should,
The federal
therefore, enjoy full federal government support.
legislation that provides a regulatory structure for tribal government
gaming, the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 84 requires
tribes to invest all net gaming revenues in tribal government social
and economic recovery, thereby fulfilling the federal goals of
tribal
strengthening
IGRA
self-determination and supporting tribal self-government.
clearly states that
net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other than-(i) to
fund tribal government operations or programs; (ii) to provide for the general welfare of
the Indian tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal economic development; (iv) to
donate to charitable organizations; or (v) to help fund operations of local government
85
agencies."

Tribal governments participating in the online financial services
industry have used this opportunity to create jobs and invest in tribal
nation building activities, including health care, education, and
infrastructure improvements. 86 Many tribes participating in tribal
lending have few other options in the wake of federal funding
shortfalls and shrinking tribal budgets, and most of them invest their
lending revenues according to the general categories outlined by the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.8 7
Tribal governments engaged in e-commerce through online
lending, whether or not they engage in gaming, have similarly
supported nation building in the following ways:
§ 1205(a), 124 Stat. at 2130.
81.
82.
§ 1205(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 2130.
§ 1205(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2130.
83.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, invalidated by
84.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
85.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012).
See, e.g., Arrow, TREASURER UPDATE (Habematolel Pomo, Upper Lake, CA), Jan.86.
June 2014, at 8, http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/HPUL-Arrow-Newsletter-14-01-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2PA-8Z29] [hereinafter TREASURER UPDATE].
87.
See, e.g., id.
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* Employment: creating jobs on tribal land, including financial
support staff, Head Start educators, and tribal housing
personnel;88
* Infrastructure: critical funding for new tribal housing and
renovation;8 9
* Education: additional classrooms, books, and teachers for Head
Start, new after-school programs, new summer youth
programs;9 0
* Tribal Services: child care services, employment training,
natural resources, development, financial assistance, utility
assistance, healthcare and wellness coverage, emergency
assistance; 9 1 and
* Social Services: child protection, low-income Home Energy
Assistance Program, family violence protection. 92
Tribal government e-commerce initiatives do not just support
basic, fundamental needs for tribal government operations and
services. They also extend the opportunity for tribes to move beyond
sheer subsistence and basic economic survival. Internet commerce
gives tribal governments hope in their ability to depart from past
struggles for survival to legitimate possibilities for continued economic
growth, prosperity, and success.
While some tribal governments have the necessary human
capital to operate online lending ventures without outside managerial
assistance, other tribes have had to look outside the tribe for
management or technical expertise. Such partnering is common for
tribal entities entering a new industry and it has succeeded in the
past for land-based businesses ranging from tribal gaming
management to US Small Business Administration 8(a) Program
contracting.9 3 "When tribal governments began to participate in the
land-based casino industry, many opponents and critics claimed that
they did not possess the business or technical skills to operate their

88.
See, e.g., id.
89.
Otoe & Missouria: Five Hundred Years of History, OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE,
http://www.omtribe.org/index.php?culture-history [https://perma.cc/4FLJ-HRQ3] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2016); see also Daugherty, supra note 35.
90.

TREASURER UPDATE, supra note 86.

91.
NAFSA,
Frozen
Homeland,
VIMEO,
https://vimeo.com/91351636
[https://perma.cc/69PK-MTM7] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
92.
Id.
93.
About the 8(a) Business Development Program, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN.,
https://www.sba.gov/content/about-8a-business-development-program
[https://perma.cclXZ7EHPJM] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
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properties successfully. 94 Some tribal governments, with approval
from the federal government-both the Department of the Interior
(DOI) and the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)-and
within a framework described in IGRA, signed agreements with
outside management companies to facilitate operations and train
tribal members for casino operations management. 9 5 In addition to
formalizing these management relationships, generally for a limited
term, tribal governments also contracted with product vendors who
supplied technology solutions for slot machine gaming, electronic
forms of bingo and other sophisticated games management, products,
Like gaming, tribal lending strengthens tribal
and services. 9 6
sovereignty through empowering tribal governments to perform due
diligence and select the proper business partners to build and learn a
complex and heavily regulated business.
E. An Indigenous Rights Perspective
Although the analysis in this Article is generally limited to
domestic law, it should be noted that the United States has endorsed
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Article 9 of the Declaration states that "indigenous peoples and
individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or
nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the
community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may
arise from the exercise of such a right." 97 Thus, it would seem entirely
inappropriate to deny tribal governments the same abilities to engage
in lending that other non-tribal institutions enjoy.9 8
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRIBAL ONLINE LENDING
This Article presents the following case studies to exemplify
the impact that tribal lending operations have on the respective tribal
communities. For most tribes engaged in lending, these operations
are a critical source of tribal government funds. While most tribal
governments participating in lending are also engaged in gaming, it is

Katherine Spilde, E-Commerce Opportunities for Tribal Governments, INDIAN
94.
GAMING (ArrowPoint Media Inc., Bellevue, WA), Oct. 2012, at 53.
95.
Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 2711 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 533 (2016).
G. William Rice, Some Thoughts on the Future of Indian Gaming, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
96.
219, 248 (2010).
G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
97.
[https
2007),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/295&Lang=E
://perma.cc[NRP6-BY3U].
See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
98.
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clear that gaming is not meeting their economic development,
employment, or community needs. 99
In some instances, tribes,
including the following examples, have either agreed to be identified
or to have had their operations discussed publicly. In other cases,
tribes have asked that their identities not be disclosed.
A. Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
The Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa located
in Watersmeet, Michigan, gained federal recognition in 1988.100 Its
reservation land is geographically isolated on its original homelands
ten miles north of the Wisconsin border in Michigan. 101 The tribe is
one of twelve bands identified as the Lake Superior Bands of
Chippewa Indians. 102 The tribe operates a variety of businesses,
including construction, day care services, restaurant, fish hatchery,
golf course, casino, and consumer financial services, including an
online lending operation. 103 Employment opportunities outside these
ventures are located thirty to fifty miles away from Watersmeet.1 0 4
Red Rock Tribal Lending, LLC, and Duck Creek Tribal
Financial, LLC, support the online lending ventures of the tribally
owned and operated financial service businesses.1 05 These tribally
owned lending enterprises started in 2012 in an industry that has
"grown nearly 20 percent since 2009."106 The tribe's general counsel
states, "[T]he revenues generated from the tribal lending entities
accounts for about 42 percent of the general fund budget."10 7 These
funds directly support programs such as housing, education,
community health clinics, scholarships, and propane assistance.10 8
With winter temperatures as cold as forty-five to forty-seven degrees

99.
Akee, Spilde & Taylor, supra note 6, at 199.
100.
NAFSA, supra note 91.
101.
Id.
102.
Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indian Community, INTERTRIBAL COUNCIL OF
MICHIGAN, INC. (2012), http://www.itcmi.org/blog/2012/10/11/lac-vieux-desert-band-of-chippewaindian-community [https://perma.cc/5GBD-3FG4].
NAFSA, supranote 91.
103.
104.
Id.
105.
Privacy Disclosure, BIG PICTURE LOANS (2016), https://www.bigpictureloans.com
/privacy-disclosure [https://perma.cc/2VGG-5Z95].
106.
Chico Harlan, Indian Tribes Gambling on High-Interest Loans to Raise Revenue,
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/indian-tribesgambling-on-high-interest-loans-to-raiserevenue/2015/03/01/8551642d-e5lb-4d3a-89c64de0d3bdf385_story.html [https://perma.cc/4PFL-8643].
107.
NAFSA, supra note 91.
Id.
108.
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below zero, propane assistance in 2013 was a necessity for many tribal
members.109
B. Otoe-Missouria Tribe
Originally from the Great Lakes Region of the United States,
the Otoe-Missouria Tribe was relocated in 1881 to the town of Red
Rock in the northern part of Oklahoma. 110 The tribe reports nearly
3,000 tribal members living in and around Oklahoma."'
The tribe's gaming enterprises fostered investments in
ventures, including a rural propane company, 112 agriculture
operations in cattle and farming, 113 convenience stores, 114 and two
financial services companies.1 15 Tribal Chair John Shotton states,
"[T]he most exciting area we've been involved in recently that's been
the most productive in our community has been online, short-term
lending and e-commerce opportunities."1 1 6 American Web Loan and
Great Plains Lending are two consumer financial service businesses
owned and operated by the tribe.1 17 In 2013, Great Plains Lending
and
tribal
thirty
employed
11 8
with
full
capacity,
center
at
its
call
to
staff
employees
non-tribal
another thirty jobs at a separate call center.1 19
At the 2015 Reservation Economic Summit, Chairman Shotton
pointed out that the tribe derives 40 percent of the total tribal
government budget from the TLEs and that the tribe's investment
priorities are aligned to meet community needs. 120 Unlike federal
funds or gaming revenues that have investment restrictions, tribes

109.
Id.
110.
Otoe & Missouria:Five Hundred Years of History, supra note 89.
111.
Id.
112.
Other Enterprises: Businesses of the Otoe Missouria Tribe, OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE,
http://www.omtribe.org/index.php?other-enterprises [https://perma.cc/GCH2-8YHC] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2016).
113.
Id.
OTOE
MISSOURIA
TRIBE,
Convenience
Stores,
114.
Tribal
Enterprises:
http://www.omtribe.org/index.php?convenience-stores [https://perma.cc/22N4-BB2W] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2016).
115.
Tribal Enterprises: Financial Services Companies, OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE,
http://www.omtribe.org/index.php?financial-services [https://perma.cc/7WJG-833YJ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2016).
https://vimeo.com/62361652
VIMEO,
Tribe,
Otoe
Missouria
NAFSA,
116.
[https://perma.cc/JS2D-AJ2V] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
John Shotton, Tribal Chair, Otoe Missouria Tribe, Comments at 2015 Reservation
Economic Summit (Mar. 12, 2015).
Id.
120.
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have flexibility when investing lending revenues. This flexibility
allows tribal leadership to invest in ways that provide direct benefits
to tribal people.
Chairman Shotton also discussed how the tribe's use of tribal
government revenues from lending has evolved over time. 12 1 During
the first year of lending, the tribe invested 100 percent of revenues
into housing renovation. 122 After years of waiting on funds from the
Native American Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act 23
and other federal funds, the tribe took the lead and renovated housing
across the reservation. 124 In the second year, it focused on new
housing and created a twenty-home addition on the reservation. 125
Next, it invested in tribal programs, including a Head Start program
with a new classroom. 126 This program is completely funded by
lending revenues. 127 The tribe further used these funds for building
and infrastructure maintenance.1 28 While the tribe can use grants or
other funding for building and infrastructure improvement, these
buildings cost money to maintain. Therefore, tribal lending revenues
are invested in ways that maximize the use and longevity of these
tribal assets. 129 The tribe also implemented investments in elders'
services, education, and economic development. 130 The Chairman
concluded his remarks by noting that, in addition to the sixty people
employed in the call centers, eight full-time employees work in the
afterschool program. 131 The revenues from the online loan companies
have made it possible to further invest in the Otoe-Missouria Tribe's
efforts of cultural preservation, language revitalization, and support
for its warrior society. The Tribal Assistance Program (TAP) relies
exclusively on tribal lending revenues. The purpose of the TAP is to:
provide financial assistance to tribal members who are unemployed, economically
32
disadvantaged, disabled or who are experiencing extraordinary circumstances.1
Assistance is available for housing (mortgage and rental), housing repairs, utilities,
dental and medical services, eyeglasses, prescriptions, hearing aids, child care, school
expenses, elder assistance and extraordinary assistance. In addition to TAP funds, the

121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
See generally Native American Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (1996).
124.
Shotton, supra note 119.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
Id.
130.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
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tribe created a Housing Department that is funded from the online lending venture that
distributes funds directly to members through home improvement options for existing
homes and building new homes with green technology and sustainability features. A
separate complex of 19 new homes aimed toward home ownership instead of renting
13 3
[are now] available to tribal members for purchase at half the cost of construction.

C. Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Tribe
The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake tribe is located in Upper
north of Sacramento. 134 The ancestors of the tribe
California,
Lake,
have been in that region of California since at least 6,000 BC. 1 35
European migration and settlement brought conflict and disease that
decimated the tribe's population by 95 percent in one generation. 136
The flawed federal policies that followed "subjected Pomo Indian
tribes to enslavement, internment, horrific abuse, and slaughter." 137
Notably, in 1950, the US Cavalry nearly eradicated the tribe by
targeting the elderly, women, and children in an aggressive military
operation known as the "Bloody Island Massacre." 38 According to the
tribal chairwoman, the "only survivor of that attack was a six-year-old
girl who survived by hiding underwater and breathing through a tule
reed." 139 Despite the systematic governmental efforts to destroy the
tribe and its identity, the tribal leadership persevered and challenged
the federal government's genocidal policies in 1975.140 Although the
litigation took nearly ten years, the tribe prevailed by regaining
federal recognition while confronting the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) continued efforts to thwart the tribe's attempts at selfdetermination. 1 4 1 Although the ancestral homeland of the tribe once
spanned parts of central and northern California, it took until 2008 for
the Department of the Interior to finally agree to accept into trust a
small, 11.24-acre tract of land for the benefit of the tribe. 142 As a
result, "[t]oday, federal law permits tribes such as Upper Lake to find
a suitable site for restoration of its tribal activities and business
operations near its aboriginal tribal lands." 143

Id.
133.
Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending, supra note 15, at 1.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id. at 2.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
http://www.upperlakepomo.com
LAKE,
UPPER
OF
POMO
HABEMATOLEL
143.
[https://perma.cc/23VW-J6S2] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
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The tribe's initial economic development entity, a casino
operation, entered its second year in the early part of 2014,144 though
the gaming facility is not yet profitable. While the tribe hopes that a
permanent building to house the gaming operation and potentially a
hotel will enhance gaming revenues and begin to generate profits, the
tribe currently generates 100 percent of its governmental budget from
a variety of consumer financial services companies it categorizes as
Tribal Lending Entities (TLEs). 14 5 These services include online
lending operations: Silver Cloud Financial, Golden Valley Lending,
and Mountain Summit Financial. 14 6 Further, to support these lending
entities, the tribe has embarked on streamlining its lending service
operations by acquiring Upper Lake Processing Services, a propriety
underwriting
system,
and Arrowshade,
a
marketing
and
lead-generation company. 147
The tribe's chairperson, Sherry Treppa, has said that revenues
from TLE-related businesses fund all of the governmental programs,
including the Honor Elder Assistance Program, the Supplemental
Assistance Self Sufficiency Program, the Summer Youth Education
Program, the Educational Clothing Allowance Program, Committee
Stipend Program, Burial Assistance Program, and Tribal Charity
Program. 148
Revenues also supplement the Seven Generations
Scholarship Program, culturally based education programs, and
acquisition of historically significant tribal lands.14 9
Chairperson
Treppa also asserts that TLE operations are a key factor in the
economic stability of the tribe. 150 In early 2014, the tribal newsletter
reported each TLE exceeded its guaranteed income baseline. 15 1 At the
annual Reservation Summit in 2015, Treppa reiterated that 100
percent of the tribal government budget comes from the TLEs, 15 2
noting that the tribe uses TLE profits to pay for all of its tribal
programs, with an emphasis on education, mainly college and adult
education, and programs to help tribal members transition from

144.
Arrow, CHAIRPERSON'S REP. (Habematolel Pomo, Upper Lake, CA), Jan.-June 2014,
at
1,
http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/HPUL-Arrow-Newsletter-14-01-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2PA-8Z29].
145.
Id. at 6.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 6-7.
148.
Arrow, CHAIRPERSON'S REP. (Habematolel Pomo, Upper Lake, CA), Oct. 2014-Mar.
2015, at 1, http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/HPUL-Arrow-Newsletter-14-Oct-15-Mar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TJ9-YEDR].
149.
Id. at 24, 26.
150.
Id. at 6.
151.

TREASURER UPDATE, supra note 86.
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unemployment to employment. Those TLE profits are also used to pay
down existing tribal debt, including the casino.
D. Other Tribal Lenders
Because of the threat of unwarranted assault from state
regulators, some tribes with lending operations declined to be
individually identified in this Article. One such tribe, however, did
highlight the direct impact of tribal lending on the health and welfare
of not only its community but also the wellbeing of nearly a dozen
other tribes in the surrounding community. 153 Among the tribes, in
one county in California, prediabetes rates are at nearly 50 percent
within the adult population. 154 One tribal chairman, who has a
lifelong devotion to health and fitness, decided that, even though his
tribe was one of the smallest in the county, it would pull together the
resources necessary for a diabetes and wellness center. 15 5 That tribe
generates no gaming revenues whatsoever, but it does generate
revenue from TLEs. 15 6 In addition to funding government programs,
the revenue from the TLEs is also servicing the debt on the loan for
the newly constructed diabetes and wellness center, which is now
providing services to all of the tribes in the county.1 57
Another tribe in the Midwest operates TLEs not only as a form
of economic development but also as a source of funds for extending its
investment efforts beyond both gaming and lending. 15 8 One of the
goals of tribal government economic development in the gaming era is
economic diversification. 1 5 9 Because gaming relies upon public opinion
and support, many tribes across the United States are hesitant to rely
In terms of
solely on gaming for long-term tribal revenues. 160

153.
Interview notes on file with Professor Clarkson.
154.
See Susan H. Babey, Joelle Wolstein, Allison L. Diamant & Harold Goldstein,
Prediabetes in California:Nearly Half of California Adults on Path to Diabetes, UCLA CTR. FOR
HEALTH POLY RES. 3 (Mar. 2016), http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/publications/Documents
/PDF/2016/prediabetes-brief-mar2Ol6.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BA8-EVWP].
Interview notes on file with Professor Clarkson. This tribe prefers to remain
155.
anonymous.

156.

Id.

157.

Id.

158.

Interview notes on file with Professor Spilde. This tribe similarly prefers to remain

anonymous.
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(Apr.
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2013),

http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
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government structure, this tribe houses its lending operation within
its larger tribal Economic Development Corporation (EDC). 16 1 The
EDC then directs 100 percent of the tribe's lending revenues into
economic diversification efforts. 162 As a result, all new (non-gaming)
jobs are directly or indirectly created by the tribal online lending
operation.1 63 Investments of lending revenue by the EDC also extend
to the renovation of old or formerly shuttered tribal businesses,1 64 as
well as a strategic restructuring of the tribe's business operations. In
addition, the tribe is breaking ground on an addiction treatment
center that will rely on EDC and lending funds for building and
maintaining the tribe's long-term commitment to health and wellness
in the community.165
V. THE PROBLEM WITH OUTSIDE REGULATION

Because small business drives much of the US economy, an
increase in small-business activity is a rational step toward decreasing
unemployment levels and other aspects of reservation economies.
However, whether they intend to or not, hostile federal and state
officials are attempting to crush the fledgling tribal e-commerce
industry, striking a blow to both consumers and tribes. 166
We have seen this scenario at least once before, at the nascent
stage of tribal gaming industry. As Professors Gavin Clarkson and
James Sebenius discussed in an earlier article, 167 when Indian gaming
began, state officials were vehemently opposed and fought vigorously
to shut down tribal gaming operations. 6 8 They succeeded in some
cases, 169 but ultimately Indian gaming has emerged as the single
greatest economic development strategy in Indian Country. Critical to
that tribal victory was the Supreme Court decision in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,170 wherein the Court told the states

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Interview notes on file with Professor Spilde.
Id.
Id.
These include smoke shops, convenience stores, and grocery stores. Id.
Id.
Dan Frosch & Alan Zibel, Tribes' Online Lending Faces Federal Squeeze, WALL ST.
J.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/tribes-online-lending-squeezed-by-regulators- 1406158967
[https://perma.cclV7TW-7BJY] (last updated July 23, 2014, 7:56 PM).
167.
See Gavin Clarkson & James K. Sebenius, A Brief History of Indian Gaming, N.M.
BuS. OUTLOOK, Mar. 2013, at 2; see also Clarkson & Sebenius, supranote 16, at 1069-79.
168.
Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 16, at 1069-79.
169.
See Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Texas, 208 F. Supp. 2d 670, 681 (E.D.
Tex. 2002); Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 713-14 (W.D. Tex. 2001);
Clarkson, supra note 16, at 1071 (discussing successful litigation against tribes in New York).
170.
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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in no uncertain terms that they had no business regulating
on-reservation economic activity when regulation is not expressly
prohibited in the state. 171
In much the same way, state efforts to regulate or eliminate
tribal government lending entities severely damage tribal economies
In many cases, lending
while providing little benefit to states.
operations have become the center of a reservation's economy and are
one of the most significant employers of tribal members. 172 When
lending operations in these communities are forced to shut down, their
absence means that critical cash resources no longer flow directly into
the tribal economy. 173 This money is often earmarked for developing
other sustainable businesses and infrastructure, and without it, tribes
are left in the same dire situation they have been in for decades. 174
Additionally, by eliminating jobs associated with tribal lending, state
overreach leaves the best and brightest tribal members with the
excruciating choice of unemployment or community abandonment.17 5
States, in contrast, benefit very little from imposing their laws
While some state residents may have the
on tribal lenders.
opportunity to escape loans they agreed to but could not repay, it
should not be a state's prerogative to nullify contracts consummated
on reservations. Expending state resources to regulate behavior on
reservations that are in some instances thousands of miles away and
share no borders with the state is similarly questionable. With this
perspective in mind, tribal loan controversies pit innovative tribal
entrepreneurs who greatly benefit their communities against states
that arrogantly presume that they know what is best for tribes and
consumers.
Looking beyond direct economic effects, state regulation
violates the most fundamental tenet of tribal sovereignty: the right of
a tribe to govern its land and people. The vast majority of tribes have
comprehensive bodies of tribal law and adjudicate disputes arising on
their territories through tribal courts.1 76 If an agreement is entered
into on tribal land and involves a tribal member, it is logical that

171.
Id. at 207.
Frosch & Zibel, supra note 166.
172.
Karrie Wichtman, Karrie Wichtman Discusses the CriticalRole that Tribal Lending
173.
Revenues Play for Her Tribe, YouTUBE (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=oivD7A~ly2Y [https://perma.cc/HHS7-6QT2].
174.
Id.
Gavin Clarkson, Nanny-State Regulators: The New "Deadliest Enemies" for
175.
Economic Development in Indian Country, N.M. BUS. OUTLOOK, Nov. 2013.
Concurrent Tribal Authority Under Public Law 83-280, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE
176.
(Nov. 9, 2000), http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/concurrent-tribal.htm [https://perma.cc/C98W
-EZZQ].
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tribal law should apply.1 77 To allow application of another sovereign's
law to such agreements-which directly implicate the economic wellbeing of the tribe-is not only counterproductive but is contrary to
nearly two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 178 Yet this
overreaching is exactly what states seek to do by regulating tribal
lenders.
Implicit in this attempted regulation is a fundamental
disrespect for tribes. Not only do states assume that tribes cannot
sufficiently govern basic loan transactions but also are willing to reach
across state boundaries in an effort to keep tribes "on the reservation"
even when a tribe has no connection to that state other than having a
citizen of that state as an on-reservation virtual visitor. In doing so,
the states violate basic notions of mutual respect that underlie the
peaceful co-existence of tribal and state governments, once more with
little benefit to show for their efforts.
State regulation also has dire implications for the rights of
consumers and businesses. 179
Tribal members structured their
lending businesses so they could offer products on the reservation that
consumers could not obtain in their respective states. These lenders
were open about the fact that only tribal law applied, and consumers
willingly consented.1 80 Nevertheless, states are now asserting that the
clear, agreed-upon terms are invalid and are trying to ban tribal
lenders from offering loans. 181 From an economic perspective, this
restriction prevents consumers from accessing products they desire
and exemplifies the "nanny state" at its worst. Instead of having the
option to enter into loan agreements under tribal law, states are
potentially leaving many consumers with no ability to borrow
whatsoever. 182
Perhaps most disturbing about state regulation efforts is their
underlying rationale. States have claimed that because borrowers
communicated with the tribal lenders through the Internet, state law
rather than tribal law must apply.183
This reasoning cannot be
right-if it were, any state could apply its laws to online transactions
involving its residents to the exclusion of other sovereigns with even
greater interests at stake. It would also mean that tribal sovereignty
is a nullity online, a regressive view that conflicts with ongoing

177.

See, e.g., 1-21 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

§

21.04 (Nell Jessup

Newton ed., 2012).
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2014), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2014/prl4O91.html [https://perma.cclM6GB-9NMJ].
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congressional efforts to promote tribal economic development and selfsufficiency. Our governmental system cannot abide these irrational
legal interpretations.
The states will have to concede that if the borrowers drove the
thousand miles to sign the paperwork on the reservation, state law
would not apply. In spite of the fact that the tribe is essentially
exporting its sovereignty via this paperwork signed on the reservation,
the states would not be able to object. Illogically, state regulators seek
to require these inefficient economic transaction costs for two poor
counterparties when they limit tribes' abilities to use advanced
technology to export sovereignty via the Internet to compete in
modern society. The same rhetoric was used when animal rights
activists attempted to deny Alaskan natives or Makah Indians their
inherent rights to engage in subsistence whaling-it was not
"traditional" to use modern technology such as high-powered rifles to
kill the whale, only hand-thrown harpoons were acceptable. 184
Now, many state regulators are arguing that tribal
governments should not be able to offer lending products over the
Internet even though larger non-Indian enterprises can legally export
interest rates on credit cards and loans with impunity.1 85 A quick
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) calculation of payroll advance lending
by major banks revealed that the rates ranged between 651 percent
and 1,303 percent,18 6 yet we are unaware of state regulators attacking
Wells Fargo or US Bank for offering loan products with rates far
higher than those offered by institutions chartered in the home states
of their customers. The ability of banks and credit card companies to
charge interest to out-of-state borrowers based on rates permitted in
states in which they are chartered was settled more than thirty-five
years ago in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Service Corp.'87 That decision, coupled with subsequent
Congressional action, 8 8 fundamentally transformed the credit card
industry by allowing banks and credit card issuers to export
nationally whatever interest rate is allowed in the state in which they
184.
See, e.g., William Yardley & Erik Olsen, With Powerboat and Forklift, a Sacred
Whale Hunt Endures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/us/insacred-whale-hunt-eskimos-use-modern-tools.html [https://perma.cc/8NZT-S9TE].
Clarkson, supra note 175.
185.
186.
According to Professor Clarkson's analysis in 2013, Wells Fargo charged $1.50 per
$20 borrowed or $7.50 per $100 borrowed, so borrowing $500 for 14 days results in a payback of
$537.50 or an APR of 977 percent. US Bank charged $2 per $20 borrowed or $10 per $100
borrowed, so borrowing $500 for 14 days results in a payback of $550 or an APR of 1303 percent.
See id.
187.
See generally Marquette Nat'1 Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299 (1978).
See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2016).
188.
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are headquartered, regardless of the law where the borrower resides.
Thus, South Dakota banks and credit card issuers are able to offer
unlimited interest rates to New York customers. 189
However,
according to New York's regulators, tribes in Oklahoma should not be
able to offer similar financial products. 190
According

to the

FDIC,

consumers

"need

.

.

. responsible

small-dollar loan products." 191 State and federally chartered banks
have a long history of offering credit consistent with US federal law,
including the extension of small-dollar, short-term credit. These loans
are offered by some banks and expressly encouraged by the FDIC. 19 2
Equal treatment should be accorded to small-dollar credit offered by
non-depository lenders, making loans consistent with applicable US
federal and tribal laws, specifically when these loans are offered by
tribal governments along the following terms:
*

Fully Disclosed. Loans made by tribal governments are
made consistent with the federal Truth in Lending Act and
provide disclosure of all material loan terms, including the
APR, finance charge, schedule of payments, and total
payments. 193

*

Authorized. Loans made by tribal governments are made
consistent with the federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act.
Accordingly, the offering of credit is not conditioned on
repayment by recurring debits.
Rather, the consumer
authorizes the debit in a specific dollar amount to be
debited on a certain date from a specific bank account. 194

*

Not "Evergreen." Loans made by tribal governments are
generally structured as short-term installment loans. As
such, the loans have a maturity date and do not
automatically roll over, extend, or renew.1 95

189.
Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, FRONTLINE (Nov. 23,
2004),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html
[https://perma.cclU2K7-XSC5]. In addition to South Dakota, federal law also allows Delaware
banks and credit card issuers to offer unlimited interest rates to New York customers. Id.
190.
See Frosch & Zibel, supranote 166.
191.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Payday Loans: Short-Term Solution or
Long-Term Problem: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 113th Cong. 2 (2013)
(statement of Mark Pearce, Director, Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection).
192.
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194.
Id.
195.

Id.

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

30

[Vol. XIX: 1: 1

VI. TRIBAL CONSUMER PROTECTION BEST PRACTICES

Although they have not directly stated that that tribal online
lenders lack the capability to regulate appropriately, that premise lies
at the core of the states' attempts to overreach and regulate distant
on-reservation conduct. As with Indian gaming, tribal nations have
repeatedly demonstrated their capability to regulate activities
involving non-Indians, often in a manner superior to those put
forward by federal or state regulators. When the US House of
Representatives Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on
February 10, 2016, the topic of the hearing was appropriately
identified as "Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB's Assault
on Access to Credit and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty." 1 9 6
In those hearings, Chairwoman Sherry Treppa detailed a
sophisticated consumer protection regime consistent with the best
practices put forward by Native American Financial Services
Association (NAFSA), 197 noting that
[f]rom our sovereign power springs the right to legislate and regulate the operations of
business activities within our jurisdiction. . . . After a thorough review of the industry
and related opportunities, our tribal council, consistent with our inherent power,
constructed a regulatory framework using the model that has proven successful in the

tribal gaming industry. 198

Chairwoman Treppa then detailed how the tribe passed
lending laws setting forth the parameters of legal operation of
consumer lending from within the reservation, specifically noting that
tribal law prohibits TLEs from "engaging in unfair, deceptive, or
fraudulent practices, or engaging in any consumer financial services
other than those expressly permitted under that ordinance. [TLEs]
that issue loans within [the reservation] must comply with that
legislation." 199 She then described the creation of a regulatory
commission charged with oversight of the TLEs and given the power
She emphasized that the regulatory
to enforce tribal laws. 200
commission is a separate instrumentality of the tribe, operating
independently of the political arm of the tribal government, noting
that "[t]he commission has the autonomy to exercise its enforcement
authority should a [TLE] violate the consumer protection laws that we
established." 201

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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Chairwoman Treppa's testimony then turned to a discussion of
how the Habematolel Pomo Indians of Upper Lake exercise their
sovereign power in other ways beyond just their "robust legal and
regulatory framework." 202 She described how her tribe, as well as
other tribes, "actively sought opportunities to enter into cooperative
agreements or compacts with states as a means to coordinate the
exercise of authority in this area and promote a collaborative
government-to-government regulatory environment." 203 She further
explained,
By way of example, our Tribe successfully entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the State of New Mexico in December, 2014, which explicitly
memorialized our Tribe's sovereign authority to engage in online short-term lending and
acknowledged that the legislation enacted by our Tribe effectively regulates transactions
between consumers and licensed lenders that occur on Trust land, adheres to best
20
practices, and does not violate federal or tribal law. 4

She then described the California Department of Business
Oversight's Information-Sharing Pilot program, a collaborative effort
between state regulators, her tribe, and other tribal members of
NAFSA, which is:
Explor[ing] opportunities to develop a framework that facilitates information exchanges
between regulatory authorities. . . . Indeed, these efforts are consistent with the regular
practice of many Tribes throughout the country to collaborate with state authorities on
tribal-state relations in areas as wide-ranging as law enforcement, environmental
20 5
protection, hunting and fishing, public lands management, and education.

As evidence that existing law is sufficient to protect consumers,
Chairwoman Treppa noted that an additional "enforcement power
available to Tribes in regulating financial services businesses, as the
CFPB itself admits, is the ability to bring legal actions under the
Dodd-Frank Act, just as States can." 2 06 She then described how, in
2015, the Navajo Nation brought an enforcement action, together with
the CFPB, against a tax refund business under this authority. 207 On
behalf of Upper Lake, she stated that:
[w]hile we have not seen the need to rely upon anything more than our own laws and
regulatory commission to handle consumer complaints and other regulatory issues, my
Tribe (and others operating small dollar lending businesses) are aware of this
significant power, and are certainly prepared to exercise it should the need to do so

202.
Id. at 3-4.
203.
Id. at 3.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. ("The experience was positive and we continue to pursue open dialogues and
additional Memoranda of Understanding with other states, ever eager to work cooperatively and
communicate openly with states as co-regulators to achieve shared goals of consumer fairness
and protection.").
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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arise. This Committee should make no mistake-ample power already exists for Tribes
208
to protect consumers and regulate businesses within its jurisdiction.

To fully illustrate what the Upper Lake Pomo had developed to
meet the needs of both consumers and tribal members, Chairwoman
Treppa then proceeded to detail its lending operations and obligations
under tribal law. TLEs "must be licensed by our Tribal regulatory
commission before they may engage in lending." 209 TLEs may not
charge consumers application fees or penalize them for early
repayment. 2 10 TLEs "must maintain a compliance management
system to ensure compliance with Tribal law, promulgated regulations
and applicable federal law." 211 The required TLE systems "must
include a full suite of written policies that covers all aspects of
lending. Each lender must also have internal controls and processes
that allow it to monitor its operations to ensure that its procedures
follow those policies."2 12
Additionally, the Upper Lake regulatory commission regularly
audits TLEs. 2 13 If the commission identifies deficiencies during an
audit, "or if a lender fails in any way to satisfy its compliance
obligations, then the commission is empowered to take corrective
action." 214 The commission's power "includes imposing fines and
penalties, as well as suspending and revoking the lender's license,
which would terminate the lender's ability to extend credit. This
regulatory framework is what our tribal lending entities operate
under, and it ensures that their practices are responsible and based on
principles of consumer protection." 2 15
Chairwoman Treppa then highlighted an important distinction
between the types of loans offered by NAFSA members, including the
Upper Lake Pomo, and payday loans. 216 Unlike payday loans, loans
authorized under Upper Lake tribal law "are unsecured loans that are
repaid in installments, which means our lenders have no real
remedies if a customer defaults. Consequently, a robust underwriting
process is an operational imperative." 2 1 7 The TLEs operating at Upper
Lake

208.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
209.
210.
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211.
Id.
212.
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use computer algorithmic waterfalls and data analytic tools to assess a consumer's
application. The amount of a customer's credit request is compared against their
income and existing credit obligations because it is a strong factor in determining their
ability to repay. An applicant's repayment history is checked because it is the strongest
factor in assessing their willingness to repay. If a customer's ability to repay or
willingness to repay do not meet the lending company's underwriting requirements, or if
2 18
the identity verification portion fails, then the application will be denied.

She then shared data from the TLEs to illustrate the rigor and
effectiveness of their underwriting. 2 19 Only 3.1 percent of 2015
applicants were accepted. 220 Of those applicants accepted for review,
"less than 2 percent were approved and funded." 221 In other words,
98.3 percent of potential new customers were rejected as a result of
the underwriting process. 222 Chairwoman Treppa then noted that
Upper Lake's "commitment to responsible lending helps to prevent
customers from taking loans they are unable to repay." 223
Chairwoman Treppa then proceeded to dispel misplaced
notions about the consumers that their TLEs serve, noting that their
average customer approved for credit is typically "[forty-five] years old
with a median income of $45,000 [and] rarely reports public assistance
or other benefits as an income source." 224 The median loan amount is
typically "$700, and, although the installment contract is structured
on a ten-month payment schedule, customers are encouraged to pay
extra toward the principal or pay off the loan early without
penalty." 225 The Upper Lake regulatory commission has "significant
data that shows customers frequently repay their loans in less than
four months. Data also shows that our customers have moderate
borrowing patterns: when measured over two years, our customers
have an average of 1.6 loans." 226
After detailing her tribe's financial dependence on revenues
from TLEs and the myriad of programs funded by TLE operations,
Chairwoman Treppa concluded her prepared remarks with a
discussion of Upper Lake's commitment to consumer protection:
For American consumers, our credit products offer options for meeting financial
obligations without fear of defaulting on an obligation, failing to pay a bill, or
overdrawing their checking account. The CFPB may consider small dollar lending to be
a scourge of the credit industry; our customers tell a different story. In 2015, our total
complaint rate was only 1.6 percent. This number likely drops to 1 percent when
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considering that some of those complaints are likely due to loan applications we denied.
That number is significant and it illustrates the quality and the legitimacy of our
operations.
My tribe agrees that consumer protection should be a primary concern of this industry,
because responding to consumer demand in a regulated, compliant, and helpful manner
is the essence of consumer protection-and that is what we do. Much of the reason we
have been successful is the strong commitment we have made to ensure that tribal
lending businesses adhere to fair and responsible lending practices that protect
227
consumers.

After both her written and oral testimony, many of the
committee members questioned the need for CFPB regulation in this
arena, and a heated discussion followed about whether CFPB was
overreaching in its attempts to regulate tribal government online
lending. 228
VII. BROADER POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL ASSAULTS
ON TRIBAL E-COMMERCE

The continued assault by state and federal regulators on tribal
online lenders discriminates against tribal courts and tribal
entrepreneurs that select tribal courts and tribal law in their
electronic commerce endeavors off-reservation. The potential damage
extends beyond tribal online lending and, in fact, imperils all tribal
attempts at e-commerce. 229 For example, one of the authors is
currently working with the Native American Business Students
Association at New Mexico State University to develop an online
marketplace to connect Indian artisans with potential off-reservation
purchasers. 230 Many of these native artisans have little or no
experience with e-commerce, and almost all of them are below the
poverty level. 231 If an American Indian artisan is asked through the
exchange to produce a piece of jewelry by a potential, non-Indian
customer from Illinois, it is perfectly reasonable for the parties to
incorporate into their contract a clause stating that disputes will be
settled in tribal court and under tribal law. Under the new rule

227.
Id.
228.
Hearing entitled "Short-term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB's Assault on Access
to Credit and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty", FIN. SERVS. COMMITTEE (Feb. 11,
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imposed by the Seventh Circuit, 232 however, such forum selection and
choice of law
provisions
would
be
inapplicable
if the
non-Indian purchaser does not travel nearly 1,500 miles to physically
enter the reservation. Instead, in order to pursue a legal remedy, the
Seventh Circuit expects the artisan to travel that same distance, at
her own expense, or hire an attorney in a jurisdiction that she has
never visited, simply because she is an Indian living on a reservation.
No other business in the United States is subject to such an arcane
requirement in selecting its preferred forum and choice of law. It is
improper and discriminatory for the Seventh Circuit to impose such a
restriction on a tribal artisan, or any reservation-based business.
Furthermore, well-established Congressional policy 2 3 3 and
Supreme Court jurisprudence 234 show strong support for tribal
economic development, which the Seventh Circuit has substantially
impaired. If extended to other circuits, this new rule would thwart
federal e-commerce efforts already underway as part of the National
Broadband Plan, such as Fast-Forward New Mexico, which helps
Navajo and Pueblo Indians develop e-commerce capabilities. 2 35
As more and more states continue to legalize online gambling,
a logical concern arises given that tribes have been exploring online
gaming as well. 23 6 As discussed earlier, tribes have fought long and
hard to exercise their sovereign right to conduct gaming on their
reservations. Will the same overly aggressive regulators who seek to
trample on tribal sovereignty in the e-commerce arena similarly
attempt to stifle tribal online gaming?

232.
See Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Here, the
Plaintiffs have not engaged in any [in person] activities inside the reservation . . . They applied
for loans in Illinois by accessing a website [rather than physically visiting the reservation].
Because the Plaintiffs' activities do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe over its land and its
concomitant authority to regulate the activity of nonmembers on that land, the tribal courts do
not have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims.").
233.

See 1-21 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 177, at

§

21.04

(listing numerous federal programs promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency).
234.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("A key goal of the Federal Government is to render Tribes more self-

sufficient ...
235.

rather than relying on federal funding.").
See FED. COMMONS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND

PLAN, 170 (2010), http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MN8F-2T9D].
236.

See Rob Capriccioso, Internet Tribal Gaming Group Tests the Waters, INDIAN

COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork
.com/2014/04/02/internet-tribal-gaming-group-tests-waters- 154292
[https://perma.cc/TX9TSYY5].
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Tribal governments are beginning to engage in a range of
e-commerce activities ranging from play-for-fun gaming sites to robust
online lending businesses. As these activities become more successful
and spread across Indian Country, state governments and the Federal
Government become more involved in monitoring and in some cases
attempting to exert regulatory authority over tribal e-commerce.
E-commerce is the great equalizer for tribal economic development
and should not be frustrated by state government interference or
attacks on tribal sovereignty by those who oppose the online lending
industry in general or tribal sovereignty in particular.
As a matter of law and policy, tribal lending businesses should
be permitted to offer loans that are governed by tribal law without
fear of state regulation. States exist to serve the people, and it is not
in the people's best interest to deny them access to financial products,
refuse to enforce their agreements, or destroy the industry of friendly,
developing economies.
Academic research challenges policy makers and the financial
services industry to focus on foundational causes for the inability of
many Americans to live within their means. Consumers of short-term
loans are often overlooked in the debate over increasing access to and
healthy competition for these tribal online lending services. When
tribal
to frustrate
states or business competitors attempt
governments' legal participation in this industry, these under-served
Rather than restrict tribal participation in this
consumers lose.
industry, the public (and public policy) would be better served by
addressing the financial mismanagement, high unemployment, and
other fiscal conditions that create a growing market for these products
in the first place.
Most importantly, tribes' ability to leverage their tribal
sovereignty should remain available for e-commerce since it provides
an opportunity for the poorest and most isolated tribes to create
business opportunities that do not rely on reservation visitors. It is
well established in federal law and policy that state laws should not
take precedence over tribal law, and this relationship should not
change automatically just because tribal governments are utilizing
technology to export their sovereignty in the online financial services
industry.

